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  The purpose of this paper is to investigate why the choice of invoice currency under exchange rate 
uncertainty depends not only on expectations but also on history.  The analysis is motivated by the 
fact that the U.S. dollar has historically been the dominant vehicle currency in developing countries.  
The theoretical analysis is based on an open economy model of monopolistic competition.  When the 
market is competitive enough, the exporting firms tend to set their prices not to deviate from those of 
the competitors.  As a result, a coordination failure can lead the third currency to be a less efficient 
equilibrium invoice currency.  The role of expectations is important in selecting the equilibrium in the 
static framework.  However, in the dynamic model with staggered price-setting, the role of history 
becomes another key determinant of the equilibrium currency pricing.  The role of history may 
dominate the role of expectations when the firms are myopic, particularly in the competitive local 
market.  It also becomes dominant in the staggered price setting when a small fraction of the new price 
setters are backward-looking.  The result suggests the importance of history in explaining why the 
firm tends to choose the US dollar as vehicle currency. 
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the choice of invoice currency in developing 
countries.  In previous literature, several theoretical studies investigated the choice of invoice 
currency in international trade.  Baron (1976) and Giovannini (1988) are their early attempts.  
The authors such as Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005), Devereux and Engel (2001), and 
Devereux, Engel, and Storegaard (2004) use a general equilibrium setup.  Recent studies that 
investigate pricing behavior of international trade with developing countries include Frankel, Parsley 
and Wei (2005).  Most of previous studies analyzed the case where the exporting firm sets prices 
either in the exporters’ currency (producer’s currency pricing, PCP) or in the importers’ currency 
(local currency pricing, LCP).  It is, however, well known that some of international trades are 
invoiced in a third currency, that is, vehicle currency (vehicle currency pricing, VCP).  Over most 
of the past hundred years, first the pound sterling and then the U.S. dollar have played a special 
role as vehicle currency in international trade.
1
Except for primary commodities, the role of vehicle currency is relatively limited in 
international trade among developed countries (see McKinnon [1979] and Magee and Rao 
[1980]).
2  The U.S. dollar, however, has historically been the dominant vehicle currency in 
international trade with developing countries.  Many developing countries have chosen the U.S. 
dollar as the vehicle currency even when they have the other developed countries as important 
trade partners.  The choice of invoice currency is particularly important in developing countries 
where efficient forward markets as well as other foreign exchange derivatives are missing to 
hedge the exchange rate risk.  
The following theoretical analysis is based on an open economy model of monopolistic competition.  
Since the export prices are set in advance, the exporting firms face uncertainty of exchange rates.  If 
necessary, the exporting firm set prices in its own currency or in the currency of the importing country.  
However, when the market is competitive enough, the exporting firms tend to set prices not to deviate 
from those of the competitors.  As a result, when the other exporters are expected to set their prices in 
the third currency, the exporting firms tends to invoice in the third currency.  The tendency becomes 
conspicuous in the staggered price-setting framework where history becomes a key determinant of the 
invoice currency. 
                                                           
1  Historians estimate that 60% to 90% of the world’s trade was invoiced in the pound sterling in the 
19
th century.  See, for example, Broz (1997).  The pound sterling retained its dominant position as key 
currency in the interwar period, although the UK passed from net creditor to net debtor after World 
War I. 
2 There are numerous empirical studies that explore the choice of invoice currency.  Some of recent 
studies include Donnenfeld and Haug (2003) for Canadian experience, Fukuda and Ono (2005) for 
 1Our model follows a partial equilibrium model in Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2002).  It, however, 
has three distinctive features that the previous study did not have.  First, we allow the exporting firms 
to choose the third currency as an invoice currency.  In developing countries, the exporting firms are 
under competition because of less differentiated products.  It is thus a natural choice for the exporting 
firm to set prices in the third currency when the competitors are expected to set their prices in the third 
currency.  The result explains the role of the US dollar as vehicle currency that prevails in many 
developing countries.  Second, we consider a dynamic Nash equilibrium where players move 
sequentially.  The model is in the tradition of Taylor (1980, 2000), in that price-setting is staggered.
3  
Firms that adjust their price in a given period set their price to maximize the present discounted value 
of profits over the periods that the price will be charged.  Even in the dynamic Nash equilibrium, the 
expectations determine the equilibrium currency pricing when the discount rate is negligible.  
However, history becomes the key determinant of the equilibrium currency pricing when future profits 
are discounted, particularly in the competitive local market.  Third, we show that a coordination 
failure can lead the third currency to be an equilibrium invoice currency.  Since multiple equilibria are 
Pareto ranked, it implies that the equilibrium choice of the invoice currency may lead to a less 
efficient equilibrium.  The risk averse exporters are always better off under the exporters’ currency 
pricing than under any other currency pricing.  It would be more efficient for the exporters to change 
their invoice currency from the vehicle currency to their own currency.  To improve the welfare, 
changing their expectations is an important factor.  However, when history does matter, it is difficult 
to change the expectations without reducing the discount rate or increasing their competitiveness.   
  In previous literature, some studies explored the role of vehicle currency in international trade.  
Krugman (1980) and Rey (2001) show that transaction costs might make vehicle currency a dominant 
medium of exchange in international trade.  These studies are, however, successful only in explaining 
the role of vehicle currency as a medium of exchange, through which transactions between currencies 
are made.  In contrast, our approach tries to explain the role of vehicle currency as a unit account in 
terms of which prices of commodities are set.  A unit account is another important function of vehicle 
currency.  Friberg (1998) and Goldberg and Tille (2005) are two exceptional studies that investigated 
the role of vehicle currency as a unit account.  Assuming that the exporter commits to sell the 
demanded quantity at the ex post realized price, they explored under what conditions the 
monopolistically competitive exporter chooses the third currency as vehicle currency.  None of these 
studies, however, explored the case where a coordination failure can lead to less efficient equilibrium 
under vehicle currency pricing.  More importantly, these studies are static analysis that could not 
analyze the case where “history” does matter.  It is well known that the U.S. dollar has historically 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Korean experience, Fukuda and Ji (1994), Oi, Otani, and Shirota (2004) for Japanese experience, and 
Wilander (2004) for Swedish experience. 
3 For recent contribution, see Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000). 
 2been the dominant vehicle currency in most of developing countries.  The following model will show 
that “history” is a key determinant for the exporters’ pricing behavior in developing countries.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  After providing some empirical evidence on the invoice currency in 
section 2, section 3 describes our basic model structure.  Section 4 drives its Nash equilibria in the 
static framework.  Section 5 explores the dynamic model with the staggered price setting and shows 
that history does matter on the choice of invoice currency.  Section 6 extends the model to the case 
where some of the new price setters change the expectations as leaders.  Section 7 summarizes our 
results and refers to their implications. 
 
 
2. Some Empirical Evidence 
During the past decades, the U.S. dollar has been the dominant vehicle currency in 
international trade with developing countries.  The Bank of Thailand reports various data sets that 
support this view.  Table 1 shows in which currencies Thai exports have been invoiced since 
1993.  It states that nearly 90% of Thai exports have been invoiced in the US dollar and that only 
10% have been invoiced in the Japanese yen.  The percentages are almost stable throughout the 
period, although the ratios of the U.S. dollar show marginal declines after 1998.   
The view is more strongly supported by Table 2 that reports the invoiced ratios of Thai exports 
classified by major trade partners.  The table indicates that the U.S. dollar tends to be the 
dominant vehicle currency in Thai exports to various countries.  When the United States, Canada, 
or Mexico are trade partners, almost all of the exports are invoiced in the US dollar.  Even when 
Japan, Europe, or the other East Asian countries are trade partners, majority of the exports are 
invoiced in the US dollar.  For example, in the exports to Japan, more than 70% are invoiced in 
the US dollar and only 20% are invoiced in the Japanese yen.  The invoiced ratio in the U.S. 
dollar is relatively modest in the exports to Germany.  However, most of exports are invoiced in 
the US dollar in the exports to the other European countries, particularly to Denmark, France, 
Ireland, United Kingdom, and Finland.  The dominance of the US dollar also prevails in the 
exports to other East Asian countries.
4  In particular, in the exports to Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Vietnam, more than 90% are invoiced in the US dollar.  Except for the exports to the United 
States, the US dollar is a third currency in the Thai exports.  This implies that the U.S. dollar 
tends to be chosen as the dominant vehicle currency in invoicing most of Thai exports.  
                                                           
4   Exceptions are the exports to Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar.  In the exports, Thai Baht is equally 
important invoice currency.  This is probably because the Thai economy has a strong influence to 
these countries. 
 3The result is essentially the same for the invoiced currency ratios in Korean exports.  Table 3 
reports in which currencies Korean exports have been invoiced since 1976.  It shows that the 
invoiced ratios of the US dollar were over 90% in visible exports and over 80% in invisible 
exports.  The dominant ratios of the US dollar declined during a past decade years.  However, even in 
recent years, the ratios of the US dollar still lied between 85% and 90% in Korean visible exports and 
around 75% in Korean invisible trades.   
Table 4 summarizes the amount shares of various export destinations from Korea and Thailand.  
We can see that Japan and Western Europe as well as other Asian countries have been the other 
important trade partners for Thai and Korean exports.   The evidence indicates that the U.S. dollar was 
chosen as the dominant vehicle currency even in the case where the United States is not a dominant 
trade partner. It is noteworthy that Japan has been the second biggest partner for both Thai exports 
and Korean exports.  This implies that Thai and Korean exporters choose the U.S. dollar as the 
vehicle currency even in the exports to one of the most important trade partners. 
One may argue that these countries choose the U.S. dollar as the dominant invoice currency 
because their exchange rates are stable against the U.S. dollar.  The argument may have been 
relevant before the Asian crisis when they effectively pegged their currencies to the U.S. dollar 
(see, for example, Frankel and Wei [1994]).  However, after the crisis, these countries shifted the 
exchange rate regime from de facto dollar peg to float.  As a result, there is no longer a natural 
reason for them to choose the U.S. dollar as the dominant invoice currency to stabilize their 
export prices in terms of domestic currencies. 
One may also argue that the U.S. dollar is the dominant invoice currency because trading 
companies are in charge of both exports and imports at the same time.  When the amount of 
exports is equal to the amount of imports, the exchange rate risk can be perfectly diversified.  
Therefore, if trading companies invoice both exports and imports in the US dollar, they would 
make a partial diversification of exchange rate risk.  Table 5 reports components of Thai export 
receipts in 2001 and 2002.  It shows that about 30% of export receipts are deposited to foreign 
currencies in both years.  The percentages indicate that Thai exporters may keep some of their 
foreign exchange receipts for reducing exchange risk in future import payments.  The table, 
however, also reports that about 65% of export receipts are exchanged from foreign currencies to 
Thai Baht directly.  This implies that more than two thirds of export receipts are still exposed to 
exchange risk in Thailand.   
 
 
3. A Model of Export Pricing Behavior under Exchange Rate Uncertainty 
 4The purpose of the following sections is to present our theoretical framework that discusses pricing 
behavior under exchange rate uncertainty.  The pricing behavior we study in the following analysis is 
that of exporters who produce only in their home country.  For simplicity, we assume that all 
exporting firms sell all of their products in a single foreign market.  There are three countries: an 
exporting country, an importing country, and a third country.  The third country has no international 
trade with the other two countries.
5
Each exporter sets its export price before the exchange rates are known.  In setting the export price, 
it has the choice among its own currency pricing (i.e., producer’s currency pricing, PCP), the 
importers’ currency pricing (i.e., local currency pricing, LCP), and the third currency pricing (i.e., 
vehicle currency pricing, VCP).  The exchange rates s0, s, and s/s0 are exogenous and are assumed to 
be the only source of uncertainty. Selling s0 units of the third currency leads to one unit of the 
importers’ currency on the spot market and selling s units of the exporters’ currency leads to one unit 
of the importers’ currency on the spot market.  By definition, the exchange rate between the exporters’ 
currency and the third currency is given by the relation s/s0.  For simplicity, we assume that each 
exchange rate is independently identically distributed with constant mean over time.  We also assume 
that s is uncorrelated with s0, so that E (s - E s)(s0 - E s0) = 0.   
  In the following analysis, each exporter is under monopolistic competition and firm j faces the 
demand function D(pj, P*), where pj is the price set by the firm j measured in the importers’ currency.  
P* is the aggregate price index in the importers’ local market denominated in the importers’ currency.  
The aggregate price index P* depends on the exchange rate unless all exporting firms set their prices 
in the importers’ currency.  We assume that the total number of firms is large enough so that an 
individual firm does not affect the price index P*. 
The objective of each exporter is to maximize the expected profits in terms of his (or her) home 
currency.  The central assumptions are that the exporter has to set price before the exchange rates are 
known and that demand is a function of the price that importers face after exchange rate uncertainty is 
resolved.  Suppose that each exporter chooses p
E under the exporters’ currency pricing, p
I under the 
importers’ currency pricing, and p
0 under the third currency pricing.  By definition, the unit price of 
imports in terms of the importers’ currency is p
E/s when invoiced in the exporters’ currency, p
I when 
invoiced in the importers’ currency, and p




denote the exporter’s profit under the exporters’ currency pricing, under the importers’ currency 
pricing, and under the third currency pricing respectively.  The profit from each currency pricing is 
then respectively given by 
                                                           
5 It would be more natural to suppose that the third country also trades with the two countries.  It may 
make the third currency pricing more likely outcome.  The main objective of the following analysis is, 
however, to show that the third currency might be chosen as an equilibrium invoice currency under a 





E/s, P*) – C[D(p
E/s, P*)], 
 (2) Π
I = s p
I D(p
I, P*) – C[D(p
I, P*)], 
 (3) Π
0 = (s/s0) p
0 D(p
0/s0, P*) – C[D(p
0/s0, P*)], 
 
where C[·] is cost function that is strictly increasing and strictly convex.  The costs are assumed to be 
incurred in terms of the exporters’ currency. 
   In the following analysis, we assume that the firms are risk averse and maximize the expected utility 
from the profits.  The utility function of each firm is U (Π), which is strictly increasing and strictly 
concave in Π. 
 
 
4. The Static Analysis  
(i) The model structure 
   We first consider the static case where the price is fixed only for a period.  In equilibrium, each 
exporter chooses the exporters’ currency pricing if EU(Π
E) ≥ EU (Π
I) and EU (Π
E) ≥ EU (Π
o), the 
importers’ currency pricing if EU (Π
I )≥ EU (Π
E) and EU (Π
I) ≥ EU (Π
 o), and the third currency 
pricing
 if EU (Π
0) ≥ EU (Π
I )and EU (Π
o) ≥ EU (Π
 E).  For analytical simplicity, we assume the 
following set of constant elasticity demand and cost functions: 
 
(4)    D(pj, P*) = A (pj/P*)
-µ, 
(5)    C(D) = B D
η,  
 
where µ > 1 and η > 1.  If the consumers in the importing country have CES preferences with 
elasticity µ > 1 among the different products, we can specify the demand for goods from firm j as (4).  
Larger µ implies higher (smaller) degree of substitutability among the products.  The aggregate price 
index in the importers’ local market P* is given by 
 
(6)   P* =



















where N is the number of firms in the importers’ local market and pi is a price set by exporting firm i 
in the importers’ currency.  
 6Under (4) and (5), the representative exporter’s expected utility for each currency denomination is 
respectively written as 
 
 (7)  E U(Π
E) = E U {A p






 (8)  E U(Π







 (9)  E U(Π








Since the choice of currency pricing is irrelevant under certainty, it holds that Π
E = Π
I  = Π
0 ≡ Π
* near 
s0 = E s0 and s = E s.  We can also show that  p
E = p
I E s = p
0 (E s /E s0) = A
η-1B µη/(µ-1).  It is easy to 
see that the optimal price is a constant markup µ/(µ-1) over the marginal cost B.   
By using the envelop theorem, a second order Taylor expansion near s0 = E s0 and s = E s leads to 
 
(10)   E U (Π
j) ≈ U(Π

















2 at s0 = E s0 and s = E s.   After some tedious calculations 
shown in Appendix, we therefore obtain that near s0 = E s0 and s = E s, 
 
(11)    [E U(Π
0) - E U (Π
I)]/ U′(Π




2 + 2 (∂
2Π
0/∂ P*∂ s0)(∂P*/∂ s0)] σ0
2, 
= - {(1/2) (1/s0)
 2 [µ(η-1) + 1] + (1/p0)(η-1)µ (∂P*/∂ s0)} p
E A (µ-1)σ0
2, 
(12)    [E U(Π
0)- E U (Π
E) ]/ U′(Π




2 + 2 (∂
2Π








E/∂ P*∂ s) - (∂
2Π
I/∂ P*∂ s)](∂P*/∂ s)} σ
2, 
= - {(1/2) (1/s0)





E [µ(η-1) - 1] + (η-1)µ (∂P*/∂ s)} A (µ-1) σ
2, 
(13)    [E U (Π









E/∂ P*∂ s) - (∂
2Π




E  [µ(η-1) - 1] + (η-1)µ (∂P*/∂ s)} A (µ-1) σ
2. 
 
where we denote the variances as σ
2 ≡ E (s - E s)
2 and σ0
2 ≡ E (s0 - E s0)
2 respectively.   
 
(ii) Nash equilibrium 
Based on (11)-(13), we investigate which currency the exporters denominate their product in a Nash 
equilibrium.  Focusing on a symmetric equilibrium, we can show that both the importers’ currency 
pricing and the third currency pricing are a Nash equilibrium if equation (11) is positive, that is, if 
 
 7(14)  µ(η-1) > 1. 
 
Both the importers’ currency pricing and the third currency pricing are a Nash equilibrium under the 
same condition because there is a herding effect where the exporting firms keep their prices not to 
deviate from those of the competitors under the competitive market.  When the importers’ currency 
pricing is a Nash equilibrium, the aggregate price P* = p
I is independent of exchange rates, so that 
equation (11) is always negative.  Therefore, the importers’ currency pricing is a Nash equilibrium 
only if equation (13) is positive, that is, µ(η-1) > 1.  When the third currency pricing is a Nash 
equilibrium, it holds that P* = p
0/s0.  Since ∂ P*/∂ s0 = - p
0/s0
2 when P* = p
0/s0, equation (12) is 
always positive if equation (11) is positive.  Therefore, the third currency pricing is a Nash 
equilibrium only if equation (11) is positive, that is, µ(η-1) > 1.   
In contrast, the exporters’ currency pricing is a Nash equilibrium under more general environments.  
When the exporters’ currency pricing is a Nash equilibrium, it holds that P* = p
E/s.  Since ∂ P*/∂ s = 
- p
E/s
2 when P* = p
E/s, both equations (12) and (13) are negative if  
 
(15)  µ(η-1) + 1 ≥ 0, 
 
The exporters’ currency pricing is therefore a Nash equilibrium if (15) holds.  The exporters’ currency 
pricing is the only Nash equilibrium if µ(η-1) < 1.  The denomination in the exporters’ currency tends 
to be the only Nash equilibrium when the local market is less competitive.  However, it is noteworthy 
that the model has multiple Nash equilibria where any currency pricing is an equilibrium if (14) holds.  
Under the multiple Nash equilibria, the choice of the currency denomination becomes arbitrary 
depending on the exporters’ expectations on which currency the other exporters will choose (that is, 
sunspots do matter).   
In our model, the multiple Nash equilibria occur when µ is large, that is, when the market is 
competitive.  In the competitive market, the exporter looses its market shares when its price exceeds 
the competitors’.  It is therefore important for the exporting firms to choose the same currency pricing 
as that of the competitors.  This indicates that the exporters’ expectations lead to arbitrary price setting, 
especially when the exporters face a competitive local market.   
It is worthwhile to note that multiple equilibria are Pareto ranked.  This implies that the equilibrium 
choice of invoice currency may be a less efficient equilibrium.  The expected utility of each exporter 
in the Nash equilibrium is respectively written as 
 
(16a)  EU(Π
I) = E U (A s p
I – A
ηB) under the importers’ currency pricing,  
(16b)  EU(Π
0) = E U [A (s/s0) p
0 – A
ηB] under the third currency pricing,  
 8(16c)  EU(Π
E) = E U (A p
E – A




I ) = U(Π
0) ≡ U(Π
*) near s0 = E s0 and s = E s, equations (16a) – (16c) imply 
that the risk averse exporters are always better off under the exporters’ currency pricing than under 
any other currency pricing.  In addition, the exporters’ utility is higher (lower) under the importers’ 
currency pricing than the third currency pricing when the variance of s is smaller (larger) than the 





5. The Dynamic Analysis 
(i) The model framework 
In the last section, we explored the choice of currency pricing in the static framework.  The 
framework is useful when considering under what circumstances expectations determine the choice of 
invoice currency in competitive local markets.  However, since the expectations are not path-
dependent, the static framework cannot explain why history is another key factor in determining 
equilibrium currency pricing.  It is widely observed that the US dollar has historically been the 
dominant invoice currency in many developing countries.  We need a theory that explains why history 
does matter in determining equilibrium currency pricing.   
In this section, we consider a dynamic Nash equilibrium where players move sequentially.  As in 
the previous section, each exporter sets price before the exchange rates are known and the demand is a 
function of the price that importers face after exchange rate uncertainty is resolved.  However, the 
price contract is long-term so that the exporters cannot change the prices for period H.  The model is 
in the tradition of Taylor (1980, 2000), in that price-setting is staggered: each firm sets its price for H 
periods.
7  In each period, a fraction 1/H of firms can choose their new price but a fraction 1-1/H of 
firms cannot.  Firms that adjust their price in a given period set their price to maximize the present 
discounted value of profits over the H periods that the price will be charged.   
Define the present discounted value of profits as Vt
 E ≡   under the exporters’ 







1 ) ( β
t






1 ) ( β t
 0 
                                                           
6 Under symmetric Nash equilibrium, all export prices are equalized, so that D(pj, P*) = A (pj/P*)
-µ = 
A.  The welfare of consumers in the importing countries therefore does not depend on the choice of 
invoice currency. 
7 It has been more common in recent work with sticky-price models to use the Calvo framework, in 
which firms face an exogenous, constant probability of being able to adjust their price.  The following 
results essentially hold even in the Calvo framework. 
 9≡  under the third currency pricing respectively, where β is a discount factor.  





0 1 ) ( β
t
 E ≥ Vt
 I and Vt
 E ≥ Vt
 0, 
the importers’ currency pricing if Vt
 I ≥ Vt
 E and Vt
 I ≥ Vt
 0, and the third currency pricing
 if Vt
 0 ≥ Vt
 I 
and Vt
 0 ≥ Vt
 E.  Unlike the static model, the dynamic model requires the comparison of the present 
discounted value of profits over H periods. 
If all exporters set the prices simultaneously, the dynamic analysis degenerates into the static case 
discussed in the last section.  In this case, to the extent that the condition (14) holds, only expectations 
matter in determining equilibrium currency pricing even in the dynamic framework.  However, if 
there is heterogeneity in the price settings, the currency the exporters initially chose could continue to 
be the equilibrium denomination currency as inertia.  The staggered price setting is a useful 
assumption that incorporates heterogeneity in the price settings in the dynamic framework. 
When the equilibrium currency pricing is history dependent and is chosen as inertia, the role of 
expectations disappears in the dynamic Nash equilibrium because changed expectations are not self-
fulfilling.  To see this, suppose that all of the exporters had historically fixed their prices in the third 
currency until period 0.  Suppose also that at period 1, the new price setting exporters formed new 
expectations that all of the new price setters would fix their prices in the exporters’ currency after 
period 1.  If the new expectations are self-fulfilling, switching from the third currency pricing to the 
extorters’ currency pricing at period 1 would be a Nash equilibrium.  Otherwise, the third currency 
pricing would remain the Nash equilibrium even after period 1.   
When the expectations are self-fulfilling, it is likely to hold that EU (Πt
 E) < EU (Πt
 o) for t < T and 
that EU (Πt
 E) > EU (Πt
 o) for t ≥ T, where 1 < T < H.  This is because the third currency pricing is still 
dominant among the exporters when t is small but the exporters’ currency pricing becomes dominant 
when t is large.  To fulfill the expectations that all of the new price setters would fix their prices in the 
exporters’ currency after period 1, it is thus necessary that  
 















⎡ Π − Π 1
1




t EU EU β
 
The above condition is a necessary condition for the exporters’ currency pricing to be a new Nash 
equilibrium.  If the condition (17) does not hold, the third currency would remain the equilibrium 
denomination currency as inertia.
8
 
                                                           
8 Strictly speaking, for the third currency to remain the equilibrium currency, we also need that 
switching from the third currency pricing to the importers’ currency pricing at period 1 would not be a 
Nash equilibrium. 
 10(ii) Calibration 
To understand what makes the condition (17) less likely to hold and under what conditions the third 
currency remains to be the Nash equilibrium, we specify the utility function and calculate the expected 
utility of the profit under three alternative currency pricings.  We specified the utility function of the 
exporters as U (Π
 ) ≡  Π /2 and calculated the utilities of the exporters for 10,000 random samples 
of exchange rates, assuming that the changes of the exchange rates follow standard normal distribution 
with zero mean.
9  In the calibration, we choose the parameter set such that η = 3, A = 1, and B = 10.  
We also set that H = 48.  In our model, a fraction of 1/H of all exporters set prices each period for H 
periods.  The period H always corresponds to the period for the prices are sticky (e.g., one year), so 
that the large value of H implies the large degree of staggering.  Altering the interpretation of the time 
unit, we can vary H to examine its role in affecting equilibrium currency pricing.  For example, if the 
time unit is weekly or semi-weekly, we can set the value of H reasonably large.  What is important in 
the following calibration is that the value of H needs to be large enough for the price setters to be very 
heterogeneous. 
Figures 1-a, 1-b, and 1-c draw the calibrated values of EU (Πt
 E), EU (Πt
 o), and EU (Πt
 I) from t = 1 
to t = H for three alternative values of µ: µ = 5, 7.5, and 10.  The calibrated values are based on the 
assumption that all of the exporters had fixed their prices in the third currency until period 0 but that 
all of the new price setters would fix their prices in the exporters’ currency after period 1.  Regardless 
of the choice of µ, EU (Πt
 o) exceeds both EU (Πt
 E) and EU (Πt
 I) when t < 24, while EU (Πt
 E) 
exceeds both EU (Πt
 o) and EU (Πt
 I) when t ≥ 24.  This reflects the fact that the third currency pricing 
is still dominant among the exporters when t is small but the exporters’ currency pricing becomes 
dominant when t is large.  Analytically, the overall price index at period t  (t = 1, 2, …, H) is 
 
  (18)  
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Even after period 1, a fraction 1 - t/H of firms still keep denominating the price in the third currency at 
period t  (t = 1, 2, …, H) in the staggered price setting.  The weight of firms that keep denominating 
the price in the third currency is large when t is small but declines over time.  The weight of firms that 
denominates the price in the exporters’ currency becomes large when t is large.  The calibrated 
utilities in the figures reflect these environments. 
When the discount factor β is small (that is, when the exporters are myopic and discount the future 
profits enough), the losses from changing expectations always dominate the benefits in the future.  It 
 11is therefore costly to change the denomination currency, so that the exporters’ currency pricing will 
not be a new Nash equilibrium.  For example, when β = 0.98, Vt
 0 = 298.69, Vt
 E = 298.32, and Vt
I = 
298.52 when µ = 10;  Vt
 0 = 307.34, Vt
 E = 307.18, and Vt
I = 307.27 when µ = 7.5;  Vt
 0 = 325.27, Vt
 E = 
325.23, and Vt
I = 325.25 when µ = 5.  The condition (17) does not hold for any of the three alternative 
values of µ.  Since the exporters have no incentive to change its denomination currency from the third 
currency to the exporters’ currency, they continue the third currency pricing as inertia when the future 
profits are discounted enough.   
In contrast, when β is very close to one, the changed expectations can lead the exporters’ currency 
pricing to be a new Nash equilibrium.  When β = 1, Vt
 0 = 461.36, Vt
 E = 461.79, and Vt
I = 461.60 when 
µ = 10;  Vt
 0 = 474.98, Vt
 E = 475.27, and Vt
I = 475.13 when µ = 7.5;  Vt
 0 = 502.85, Vt
 E = 503.02, and 
Vt
I = 502.94 when µ = 5.  In our parameter set, Vt
 E always exceeds both Vt
 0 and Vt
I under the changed 
expectations for any of the three alternative values of µ.  The exporters have an incentive to change its 
denomination currency from the third currency to the exporters’ currency when the exporters do not 
discount the future profits.  Only expectations play the essential role in changing the equilibrium 
currency pricing.  To the extent that all of the new price setters are expected to fix their prices in the 
exporters’ currency after period 1, the exporters’ currency pricing always becomes a new Nash 
equilibrium after period 1 when β = 1.  It is, however, worthwhile to note that the exporters need to 
change the expectations after period 1 for the exporters’ currency pricing to be an equilibrium.  If 
none of the new price setters changed the expectations at period 1, the third currency pricing would 
remain a Nash equilibrium after period 1 even when β = 1. 
In our parameter set, some intermediate cases arise when β is around 0.99.  When β = 0.99, Vt
 0 = 
368.06, Vt
 E = 368.00, and Vt
I = 368.05 when µ = 10;  Vt
 0 = 378.82, Vt
 E = 378.84, and Vt
I = 378.84 
when µ = 7.5;  Vt
 0 = 400.98, Vt
 E = 401.02, and Vt
I = 401.01 when µ = 5.  The exporters have an 
incentive to change its denomination currency from the third currency to the exporters’ currency if µ =  
5 or 7.5 but do not if µ = 10.  When β = 0.9875, Vt
 0 = 348.77, Vt
 E = 348.62, and Vt
I = 348.72 when µ 
= 10;  Vt
 0 = 358.95, Vt
 E = 358.91, and Vt
I = 358.94 when µ = 7.5;  Vt
 0 = 379.93, Vt
 E = 379.95, and Vt
I 
= 379.94 when µ = 5.  The exporters have an incentive to change its denomination currency from the 
third currency to the exporters’ currency if µ = 5 but do not if µ = 10 or 7.5.  Note that the parameter µ 
becomes large when the importers’ local market is competitive.  Because of less differentiated 
products, competitive local market is more relevant for exporters in developing countries.  It is 
therefore more likely that the exporters continue the third currency pricing as inertia in developing 
countries.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 In the calibrations, we also tried varieties of normal distributions with different variances.  The 
essential results were, however, the same. 
 12As in the static model, the risk averse exporters are always better off under the exporters’ currency 
pricing than under any other currency pricing in the long-run.  Therefore, even in the dynamic Nash 
equilibrium model, a coordination failure may make the equilibrium currency pricing less efficient.  
However, unlike in the static model, not only expectations but also history plays a key role in 
determining the equilibrium currency pricing.  The exporters know that moving from the third 
currency pricing to the exporters’ currency pricing is desirable in the long-run.  However, they also 
know that majority of the other exporters cannot change the past currency pricing rule in the short-run.  
History therefore discourages their incentive to change the currency pricing role.  The role of history 
becomes particularly important when the price settings are very heterogeneous, when the future profits 
are discounted, and when the local market is competitive. 
In most developing countries, the US dollar has historically been the dominant vehicle currency.  
This has been true even when the other developed countries are another trade partners for the 
developing countries.  Once a country’s currency is established as an invoice currency, a large change 
in economic environment is necessary to replace it, even if the relative economic power of that 
country has declined in world trade.  In the long-run, it would be more efficient for the exporters to 
change their invoice currency from the vehicle currency to their own currency.  To achieve the long-
run goal, changing their expectations is an important factor.  However, when history does matter, 
making the firms less myopic and increasing their competitiveness would be the other important 
factors to improve their welfare. 
 
 
6.  The Model with Backward-looking Price Setters 
   In the last section, we investigated a dynamic Nash equilibrium where all of the new price setters 
change the expectations simultaneously.   However, given that all of the exporters had fixed their 
prices in the third currency until period 0, it is less likely that all of the new price setters would 
suddenly change their expectations on currency pricing after period 1.  Instead, it is more likely that 
some of the new price setters form backward-looking expectations at period 1.  Only forward-looking 
leaders would change the expectations at period 1 and that the other new price setters would follow 
the leaders after period 2.  The purpose of this section is to investigate a dynamic equilibrium under 
such expectation formation with inertia. 
   As in the last section, all of the exporters had fixed their prices in the third currency until period 0. 
However, unlike in the last section, we assume that a fraction α of the new price setters (0 < α < 1) 
observed a sunspot at the beginning of period 1.  Only those who observed the sunspot fix their prices 
in the exporters’ currency at period 1 and form new expectations that all of the new price setters 
would follow the currency pricing after period 2.  If the new expectations are self-fulfilling, switching 
from the third currency pricing to the extorters’ currency pricing at period 1 would be a new 
 13equilibrium.  Otherwise, the third currency pricing would remain the only equilibrium even after 
period 1.  When the fraction α is large enough, it still holds that EU (Πt
 E) < EU (Πt
 o) for t < T* and 
that EU (Πt
 E) > EU (Πt
 o) for t ≥ T*, where 1 < T* < H.  However, T* becomes larger as α become 
smaller.  This is because a fraction 1-α of the exporters, who had chosen the third currency pricing at 
period 1, cannot change their currency pricing until period H+1. 
   Like the last section, we specify the utility function of the exporters as U (Π
 ) ≡  Π /2 and choose 
the parameter set such that η = 3, µ = 7.5, A = 1, and B = 10 in the calibration.  Unlike the last section, 
we set that H = 5 (so that the unit of time is monthly).   The use of the lower value of H is to 
demonstrate whether history matters or not even if the price setters are less heterogeneous.  Without 
backward-looking price setters (that is, when α = 1), the new expectations would be self-fulfilling 
unless β is unreasonably small.  However, when α is less than 1, the new expectations may not be 
self-fulfilling even if β is close to one.   
We calculated the utilities of the exporters for 10,000 random samples of exchange rates, assuming 
that the changes of the exchange rates follow standard normal distribution with zero mean.  Table 6 
reports the calibrated values of Vt
 E, Vt
 I, and Vt
 0 for alternative values of α and β.  When α = 1, Vt
 E 
exceeds both Vt
 I and Vt
 0 if β is greater than 0.71.  When α = 0.9, Vt
 E still exceeds both Vt
 I and Vt
 0 if 
β is greater than 0.82.  This implies that the expectations are self-fulfilling under reasonable discount 
factors if most of the new price setters observe the sunspot at the beginning of period 1.  In contrast, 
when α = 0.75, neither Vt
 E nor Vt
 I exceeds Vt
 0 even if β = 1.  This implies that more than three-fourth 
of the new price setters need to be forward-looking leaders at period 1 for the exporters’ currency to 
be a new equilibrium.  Some intermediate case arises when α is equal to 0.8.  The exporters have an 
incentive to change its denomination currency from the third currency to the exporters’ currency if β 
is greater than 0.97 but do not if β is less than 0.955.  In the intermediate case, the discount rate plays 
a critical role on the choice of currency pricing. 
When we change the value of H to be 1 (that is, no price staggering), the calibration shows that Vt
 E 
always exceeds both Vt
 I and Vt
 0 if  α ≥ 0.47.  Therefore, in the static framework, the exporters’ 
currency can be a new equilibrium even when half of the new price setters are backward-looking.  In 
contrast, the exporters’ currency can be a new equilibrium in the dynamic framework with staggered 
price setting even if much larger fraction of the new price setters are forward-looking.  This happens 
because not only backward-looking price setters but also non-price setters keep the old currency 
pricing when the prices are staggered.  This implies that the role of history becomes dominant in the 
staggered price setting even when a relatively small fraction of the new price setters are backward-
looking.  It is true even if the degree of heterogeneity is not large. 
 14In practice, firm’s pricing (invoicing) contract is at most several months.  Therefore, when the value 
of H is large, we need to set the interpretation of the time unit reasonably short.  In particular, when 
the time unit is reasonably short, a realistic discount factor β would be very close to one.  The above 
results thus suggest that the existence of backward-looking price setters will provide more reasonable 
environments where history plays a key role in determining the equilibrium currency pricing.  
However, our results also suggest that unless the value of H is very small, a fraction of backward-
looking setters need not be so large. 
 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This paper investigated the choice of invoice currency under exchange rate uncertainty.  The 
analysis was motivated by the fact that the U.S. dollar has historically been the dominant vehicle 
currency in developing countries.  When the market is competitive enough, the exporting firms tend to 
set their prices not to deviate from those of the competitors.  As a result, when the other exporters are 
expected to set their prices in a third currency, the exporting firm tends to choose the third currency as 
an equilibrium invoice currency.  In particular, in the staggered price-setting framework, history 
becomes a key determinant of the equilibrium currency pricing when the firms discount future profits, 
particularly in the competitive local market, and when there are backward-looking price setters.   
For analytical tractability, we used several assumptions in the model.  Although the simplified 
assumptions allowed us to focus an essential aspect on the determinants of currency pricing, our paper 
may have neglected several other important aspects.  For example, we solely focused on the case 
where exporters have monopoly power but importers do not.  The model of monopolistic competition 
where exporters have monopoly power is standard in literature and may make it easy to compare our 
results with previous studies.  However, importers have monopoly power in some international trades 
from developing countries to developed countries.  If importers have monopoly power, the importers’ 
currency pricing (local currency pricing, LCP) may be more likely to be chosen when the market 
is less competitive.  The extension is our important agenda for our future researches.  Our 
analysis also relied on several specific functional forms.  It is worthwhile to note that exchange 
rate volatilities play no role in determining the equilibrium invoice currency under the specific 
functional forms.  However, exchange rate volatilities can affect the equilibrium choice of invoice 
currency under more general functional forms.  If this is the case, which exchange rate regime the 
exporters’ country adopts might be an important determinant of the invoice currency. 
One of the motivations of the paper was based on the fact that the US dollar has been the dominant 
invoice currency in several East Asian countries.  However, the dominant role of the US dollar had 
also prevailed in Japanese exports until very recently.  As Japanese economy showed remarkable 
 15growth, the role of Japan’s exports in international trade increased substantially in the 1960s and the 
1970s.  The share of the Japanese Yen’s denomination in the Japan’s exports, however, had been 
negligible until the early 1970s.  Table 7 reports time-series data of invoice currency data in Japan’s 
exports.  The Yen’s invoice ratios were close to zero in the early 1970s and were less than 20% 
throughout the 1970s.  It was 1983 when the Yen’s share exceeded 40% in the Japan’s exports to the 
world.  But the Yen’s invoice ratios were not far above 40% even in the early 1990s and declined 
below 40% throughout the 1990s.  The Yen’s ratios in the exports were not high even for East Asia, 
although they were slightly higher than for the rest of the world. 
In explaining the determinants of invoice currencies in Japan’s exports, we may point out several 
factors that were not discussed in the paper.  The first is the heavy reliance of Japan’s exports on the 
United States. Since only a small fraction (16 percent in 1991) of Japanese exports to the United 
States are invoiced in the yen and since a large fraction of Japanese exports go to the United States, 
the structure of Japan’s exports leads to relatively low yen-denominated invoice currency ratios in 
Japan’s total exports. The structure may affect the choice of invoice currency on Japan’s exports to the 
other countries.  The second is the relatively small size of the short-term capital market in Japan. 
Although its volume has been increasing recently, the size of the treasury bill market in Japan is still 
much smaller than in the United States. Since the short-term capital market would be where foreign 
investors would park their yen-denominated funds, its limited size reduces the invoice currency ratio 
of the yen in trade. The third is the role of Japan’s large trading companies, which handle the bulk of 
Japanese exports and imports. Since these companies have a relative advantage in avoiding foreign 
exchange risks, their existence may lead to relatively low yen-denominated invoice currency ratios in 
Japan’s total exports.  However, in addition to these factors, it is likely that both history and 
expectations have been the important factors.  Due to the previous economic power, the U.S. dollar 
still plays an important role in Japan’s international trade.  The expectations support the inertia.  
Although Japan’s economic power in world trade has risen, it would be a long way for the yen to be 
the key currency in world trade. 
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 18Appendix:  Derivations of (11)-(13). 
 
  Equations (1)-(3) and (6) imply that ∂Π
E/∂ P* = ∂Π
I/∂ P* = ∂Π
0/∂ P*, ∂
2Π
I/∂ P*∂ s = ∂
2Π




2 P* = ∂
2Π
I/∂
2 P* = ∂
2Π
0/∂


















2 + 2 (∂
2Π














2 s) + 2 (∂
2Π






2)(∂P*/∂ s0)  
+ [Π22




2 + 2 [(∂
2Π
E/∂ P*∂ s) - (∂
2Π
I/∂ P*∂ s)](∂P*/∂ s)]( ∂P*/∂ s) 
 
at s0 = E s0 and s = E s.   
  Since equation (10) lead to 
 
(A5)  [E U(Π
0) - E U (Π
I)]/ U′(Π







(A6)  [E U(Π
0) - E U (Π
E)]/ U′(Π







(A7)  [E U(Π
I) - E U (Π
E)]/ U′(Π








we can derive that  
 
(A8)  [E U(Π
0) - E U (Π
I)]/ U′(Π




2 + 2 (∂
2Π
0/∂ P*∂ s0)(∂P*/∂ s0)] σ0
2 






(A9)  [E U(Π
0) - E U (Π
E)]/ U′(Π




2 + 2 (∂
2Π

















2 + 2 [(∂
2Π
E/∂ P*∂ s) - (∂
2Π
I/∂ P*∂ s)](∂P*/∂ s)} σ
2), 
(A10)  [E U(Π
I) - E U (Π
E)]/ U′(Π










2 + 2 [(∂
2Π
E/∂ P*∂ s) - (∂
2Π
I/∂ P*∂ s)](∂P*/∂ s)} σ
2. 
 














I/∂ s = A p














 19Since P* E s = p
E = p
I E s = p
0(E s /E s0) = A
















 2 [(µ-1) (µ-2) A  p




















 2 [µ (µ-1) A p
E  s

















0) [A µ (µ-1) (p



























I/∂ P*∂ s = Aµ (P*/p
I) 
µ-1 = A µ . 
 
These equations lead to the second part of equations (11)-(13). 
 20Table 1. Structure of Export Receipts in Thailand  (Percent share)
 Currencies 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
US dollar 91.8 90.5 91.0 91.7 92.0 90.6
Baht 0.9 1.6 2.4 1.3 2.1 2.6
Japanese yen 3.9 4.7 4.1 4.5 3.3 3.7
Deutsche mark 1.0 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.7
Pound sterling 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4
Euro 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Singapore dollar 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3
Others 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
 Currencies 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
US dollar 87.6 87.0 85.7 84.7 84.4
Baht 3.7 3.9 4.0 4.3 5.0
Japanese yen 5.2 5.7 5.6 6.0 5.9
Deutsche mark 1.5 1.2 0.8 0.0 0.0
Pound sterling 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Euro 0.2 0.6 2.0 3.2 2.7
Singapore dollar 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Others 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sourcesʣ The Bank of Thailand.  
 
 21Table 2. Structure of export receipts from major trading partners
classified by currency in Thailand  (Percent share)
USD JPY THB USD JPY THB
Japan 71.8 20.5 7.3 71.0 20.9 7.4
USD JPY THB USD JPY THB
NAFTA
   - USA 97.1 0.3 2.6 96.4 0.4 3.2
   - Canada 97.3 0.0 0.2 97.3 0.2 0.3
   - Mexico 99.7 0.0 0.2 98.1 0.0 0.2
Total 97.1 0.3 2.5 96.4 0.4 3.0
USD GBP DEM THB EURO Others
European  Union
     - Belgium 74.5 2.0 0.0 1.8 21.4 0.3
     - Denmark 92.8 0.0 0.0 2.6 2.6 2.0
     - France 87.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 11.4 0.6
     - Germany 50.1 0.0 0.2 1.1 47.8 0.8
     - Greece 81.7 0.0 0.0 0.6 17.6 0.1
     - Ireland 96.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.2 1.1
     - Italy 83.4 0.0 0.0 0.5 15.4 0.7
     - Luxembourg 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 83.1 0.2
     - Netherlands 61.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 37.4 0.9
     - Portugal 74.1 0.0 0.7 0.2 24.9 0.1
     - Spain 81.4 0.2 0.1 0.4 17.7 0.2
     - United Kingdom 88.5 6.8 0.0 2.1 2.4 0.2
     - Austria 41.2 0.0 0.2 7.5 50.9 0.2
     - Sweden 88.7 0.1 0.0 4.3 1.2 5.7
     - Finland 91.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 6.5 1.5
Total 73.0 2.1 0.1 1.3 22.9 0.6
USD JPY THB SGD MYR Others
ASEAN
     - Singapore 91.6 2.2 3.3 1.3 0.0 1.6
     - Indonesia 79.2 2.8 10.3 0.2 0.0 7.5
     - Philippines 84.2 1.9 5.9 6.8 0.0 1.2
     - Malaysia 93.3 1.1 3.8 0.4 0.8 0.6
     - Brunei Darussalam 64.5 0.4 9.3 25.2 0.0 0.6
     - Cambodia 47.0 0.2 52.0 0.4 0.0 0.4
     - Laos 49.3 0.2 49.9 0.0 0.0 0.6
     - Myanmar 65.6 0.2 33.7 0.0 0.1 0.4
     - Vietnam 95.9 0.5 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.1
Total 89.0 1.9 6.1 1.3 0.1 1.6
Sourcesʣ The Bank of Thailand.
Partner Country 2001 2002
Partner  Country 2002
Partner  Country 2002
 
Notes of Table 2) USD = US dollar,  JPY = Japanese Yen,  THB = Thai Baht,  GBP = Pound Sterling,  
SGD = Singapore Dollar,  DEM = Deutsche Mark,  and MYR = Malaysian Ringitt. 
 22Table 3. The Shares of Payment Currencies in Korean Exports
(1) Visible Trade
ʢUnit: ˋʣ
US Dollar Yen Mark Pound
1976 99.08 0 0.25 0.37
1980 95 2.15 1.58 0.45
1985 94.24 3.84 0.76 0.38
1990 88.21 7.44 2.2 0.87
1992 88.78 6.25 2.82 0.85
1994 88.86 6.41 2.58 0.50
1996 89.1 5.13 2.21 0.98
1997 89.21 5.02 1.76 0.85
1998 88.54 4.95 2.66 0.97
1999 85.61 5.96 2.39 0.95
2000 84.76 5.39 1.8 0.67
2001 87.42 5.39 1.47 0.71
(2) Invisible Trade
ʢUnit: ˋʣ
US Dollar Yen Mark Pound
1976 83.86 5.73 2.09 0.29
1980 83.45 4.60 0.98 0.39
1985 87.78 8.86 0.97 0.41
1990 65.58 25.67 2.99 2.81
1992 67.79 22.51 3.65 2.06
1994 70.08 22.09 3.11 0.91
1996 75.48 17.18 2.40 0.80
1997 77.22 15.77 2.35 0.99
1998 77.79 16.32 1.79 0.67
1999 74.52 18.96 1.12 1.03
2000 75.87 16.27 0.65 1.23
2001 74.38 14.06 0.47 1.37
Sourcesʣ The Bank of Korea, Monthly Statistical Bulletin, various issues.
 23Table 4ɽKorea and Thailand's exporting destinations ( exports to an area ʗexports to the world)
Destination 1997 1999 2001 2003
Korean exports Industrial countries 41.6% 50.5% 48.6% 43.7%
  United States 15.2% 20.6% 20.9% 17.8%
  Japan 10.3% 11.0% 11.0% 9.0%
  Western Europe 13.5% 15.8% 13.7% 13.6%
  Canada, Australia, New Zealand 2.8% 3.0% 3.0% 3.3%
Eastern Europe 4.4% 2.7% 2.7% 3.3%
East Asia 35.1% 32.9% 33.6% 40.2%
  China:Mainland 9.4% 9.5% 12.1% 18.2%
  China:Hong Kong 8.1% 6.3% 6.3% 7.6%
  Indonesia 2.5% 1.8% 2.2% 1.8%
  Malaysia 3.0% 2.5% 1.8% 2.0%
  Philippines 1.8% 2.2% 1.7% 1.5%
  Thailand 1.6% 1.2% 1.2% 1.3%
  Vietnam 1.1% 1.0% 1.2% 1.3%
  Singapore 4.0% 3.4% 2.7% 2.4%
  Others 3.6% 4.9% 4.4% 4.0%
South Asia 1.8% 1.8% 1.8% 2.2%
Middle East + Afganistan 3.4% 4.2% 4.6% 4.3%
Western Hemishere 5.8% 5.9% 6.4% 4.5%
Africa, N. Korea, & Area not specified 7.9% 2.0% 2.3% 1.9%
DOTS World Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Thai exports Industrial countries 54.4% 57.4% 56.5% 51.3%
  United States 19.4% 21.7% 20.3% 17.0%
  Japan 15.2% 14.1% 15.3% 14.2%
  Western Europe 16.9% 17.9% 17.3% 15.9%
  Canada, Australia, New Zealand 2.9% 3.7% 3.6% 4.2%
Eastern Europe 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 1.3%
East Asia 36.4% 32.0% 33.7% 38.5%
  China:Mainland 3.0% 3.2% 4.4% 7.1%
  China:Hong Kong 5.9% 5.1% 5.1% 5.4%
  Indonesia 2.4% 1.7% 2.1% 2.8%
  Korea 1.8% 1.6% 1.9% 2.0%
  Malaysia 4.3% 3.6% 4.2% 4.8%
  Philippines 1.2% 1.6% 1.8% 2.0%
  Vietnam 0.9% 1.0% 1.2% 1.6%
  Singapore 11.1% 8.7% 8.1% 7.3%
  Others 5.7% 5.7% 5.0% 5.4%
South Asia 1.3% 1.5% 1.7% 1.8%
Middle East + Afganistan 3.4% 3.5% 3.3% 3.6%
Western Hemishere 1.1% 1.3% 1.7% 1.5%
Africa, N. Korea, & Area not specified 2.4% 3.3% 2.3% 2.1%
DOTS World Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: IMF DOTS(Direction of trade statistics) 
NoteɿSouth Asia includes Pakistan, Nepal, Indea, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Maldives.  
 24Table 5. Components of Export Receipts in Thailand  
(Percent share)
2001 2002
FX reciepts exchanged to baht 63.9 66.8
Baht receipts through non-residents baht. 4.2 4.7
Payment to foreign creditors 1.0 0.8
Deposit to foreign currency A/C 30.9 27.7
Total 31.9 28.5
Sourcesʣ The Bank of Thailand.  
 25Table 6. The Discounted Utilities for Alternative Values of α and β





0.9 40.5077 40.5605 40.5352
0.8 33.2652 33.2870 33.2769
0.7125 28.1094 28.1111 28.1107
0.71 27.9766 27.9778 27.9776
0.7075 27.8445 27.8452 27.8453
0.705 27.7131 27.7134 27.7137
0.7025 27.5826 27.5823 27.5829
0.7 27.4527 27.4520 27.4528
0.6975 27.3236 27.3225 27.3235
0.695 27.1953 27.1937 27.1949





0.9 40.5303 40.5503 40.5410
0.85 36.7111 36.7189 36.7155
0.84 35.9950 36.0005 35.9983
0.83 35.2943 35.2976 35.2964
0.825 34.9496 34.9518 34.9512
0.82 34.6086 34.6098 34.6097
0.815 34.2713 34.2715 34.2719
0.81 33.9377 33.9369 33.9377
0.805 33.6077 33.6059 33.6072
0.8 33.2813 33.2786 33.2804
 
 26Table 6. The Discounted Utilities for Alternative Values of α and β
(continued)





0.99 48.5199 48.5260 48.5234
0.98 47.5603 47.5642 47.5628
0.975 47.0878 47.0905 47.0896
0.97 46.6200 46.6216 46.6213
0.965 46.1569 46.1575 46.1576
0.96 45.6985 45.6980 45.6987
0.955 45.2448 45.2432 45.2444
0.95 44.7957 44.7930 44.7948
0.94 43.9111 43.9065 43.9092
0.93 43.0446 43.0380 43.0417





1 49.5114 49.4990 49.5056
0.999 49.4126 49.4000 49.4066
0.995 49.0193 49.0059 49.0130
0.99 48.5321 48.5178 48.5253
0.98 47.5722 47.5561 47.5645
0.97 46.6315 46.6137 46.6229
0.96 45.7097 45.6903 45.7003
0.95 44.8065 44.7855 44.7963
0.94 43.9216 43.8991 43.9106
0.93 43.0547 43.0307 43.0430
Note) Each shaded area denotes the largest utility for each b.  
 27Table 7. Invoice Currency Ratios in Japan's Exports
For Total World
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Yen 0.6 0.9 2.0 8.6 11.3 15.0 17.0 19.4
US dollar 90.1 90.5 90.4 82.8 81 77.7 78.5 76.3
1977 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Yen 18.8 19.8 28.9 31.8 33.8 40.5 39.5 39.3
US dollar 76.9 75.4 66.3 62.8 60.9 50.2 53.1 52.2
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Yen 35.5 33.4 34.3 34.7 37.5 39.4  40.1
**  39.9
**




1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 2000 2001 2002




US dollar - - - -
For East Asia
1981 1983 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Yen 29.8 48 47.3 41.1 41.2 43.5 48.9 50.8
US dollar 68.9 - 51.3 56.5 56 53.6 48.1 45.9
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 2000 2002
Yen 52.3 52.5 49.0 44.3 46.3 47.0 50.0
## 51.3
##
US dollar - - - - - - - -
NOTES 1) Unless specified,  the data are averaged annually.  
      2) The data with * show figures for fiscal year. 
      3) The data with ** show those of September.
      4) The data with ## show those of the second half ot the year.
SOURCES 1) Exports: Until 1982, Yushutsu Shinyojyo Toukei by Bank of Japan;  between 1983 and 1991, 
            Export Confirmation Statistics by MITI. For 1992, Kessai Tuka Douko by MITI.
        2) Imports: Until 1980, Yushutsu Syonin Todokede Houkokusho by MITI;  Between 1981 and 1985, 
            Houkokusyorei Ni  Motoduku Houkoku by Ministry of Finace;  Between 1986 and 1991, Import 
            Reporting Statistics by MITI. 
            For 1992, Kessai Tuka Douko by MITI.   For 1993,  Yusyutu (Yunyu) Houkokusyo Douko by MITI.  
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